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Determinants of Iowa Cropland Cash Rental
Rates: Testing Ricardian Rent Theory
Xiaodong Du, David A. Hennessy, and William M. Edwards
Based on the Ricardian rent theory, this study employs the variable profit function to
analyze the determinants of Iowa cropland cash rental rates using county-level panel data
from 1987 to 2005. Accounting for spatial and temporal autocorrelations, responses of local
cash rental rates to changes in output prices and other exogenous variables are estimated.
We find that Iowa cash rental rates are largely determined by output/input prices, soil
quality, relative location, and other county-specific factors. Cash rents go up by $79 for
a $1 increase in corn price in the short run. The marginal value of cropland quality, as
represented by row-crop corn suitability rating index, is about $1.05. Ethanol plants are
not found to have a significant local effect on cash rental rates, impacting local rental
markets mainly through the national futures price. Scale of the local livestock industry
and adoption of genetically engineered crops have significant impacts on local cash rental
rates. In addition, changes in crop output prices are found to have long-run effects on
cash rental rates. The long-run change in cash rents is approximately $109-$114 for a $1
change in corn price and is reached in about four years. Our research may be viewed as a
test of the Ricardian rent theory. We find limited support for the theory.
Key words: bargaining, basis, ethanol, land quality shadow price, rate of adjustment,
spatial autocorrelation.
JEL classification: C5, G1, Q1.
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Iowa is one of the major corn growing states in the United States, producing 19% of U.S. corn
and 16% of U.S. soybeans in 2006. As a result of rapid expansion in the ethanol industry,
the amount of corn used for ethanol production increased from 600 million bushels in 2001
to nearly 1.8 billion bushels in 2006. The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates that 3.4
billion bushels of corn will be used in ethanol production in the 2007/08 crop year. In spring
2007, farmers responded by planting an estimated 92.9 million acres to corn, the most since
World War II, and a 19% increase over 2006. Biofuel-derived demand for corn pushed up the
price of corn nearly 70% between September 2006 and March 2007. How do the cash rental
rates respond to high corn prices? Do they increase immediately to the new equilibrium level
or adjust dynamically? These are the sorts of questions we seek to answer in this study.
Farmland is the main financial asset of crop farmers. In 2006, the total value of Iowa’s
32.6 million acres of farmland was about $105 billion and the average value per acre was at an
all-time high of $3,204 (Iowa State University Extension 2006a). A better understanding of the
determinants of local cash rental rates is important because, for Iowa, an increasing fraction
of farmland is being farmed by tenant operators. Excluding land in government programs, the
amount of land that is rented increased from 43% to 59% between 1982 and 2002. By 2002
more than two-thirds of the leased farmland was under a cash rent arrangement (Iowa State
University Extension 2004).
In the Ricardian rent theory, rent is defined as “that portion of the produce of the earth,
which is paid to the landlord for the use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil”
(Ricardo 1821, p. 67). Ricardo argued that rent is what remains from gross farm revenue after
all the production costs have been paid. In Ricardo’s view, rent is the value of the difference in
productivity, which is crucial in determining the existence and magnitude of land rent. Ricardo
explained this by pointing out that in the first settling of a country, only the very best lands
go under cultivation. These lands are the most fertile, the closest to the market, and with
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the lowest cost for producing grain. When the last piece of land is cultivated, production cost
equals the sum of wage cost and the normal rate of profit, assuming that rent on this last
piece of land is zero and the farmers are indifferent between farming and not farming. But on
the more productive land, higher productivity produces a surplus that is expropriated by the
landlord in the form of rent.
Economic theory suggests that higher crop production profits resulting from good grain
prices will ultimately accrue to the farmland owners because farmland, not labor, is the most
limiting resource in agriculture. It is reasonable to assume that tenant farmers are identical
and in plentiful supply since much of farm labor involves only lower levels of technical skills.
Demand for farm labor has been rapidly reduced because of mechanization and other labor-
saving technologies. Farm jobs fell from 12.4% of non-metro low-skill jobs in 1976 to 6.2%
by 2004 (Gibbs, Kusmin, and Cromartie 2005). From 1960 to 2004, total labor (hired, self-
employed and unpaid family) use in Iowa agriculture declined by about 90% (Huffman 2007).
Much of this labor has been available to re-enter agriculture if only because many farmers have
reluctantly turned to part-time off-farm employment. Hence, farmland becomes the residual
claimant of profits. Farmers bid aggressively to expand their land base. With the assumption
of free entry and exit from farming in a perfectly competitive market, competitive bidding on
land use ensures that rent payments equal the difference between revenues and other costs.
The objective of this study is to empirically investigate the determinants of Iowa cropland
cash rental rates, to analyze the dynamic adjustment process of cash rental rates to changes
in output prices, and to provide evidence on the validity of the Ricardian rent theory. The
literature on formal analysis of farmland cash rental rates is limited. Kurkalova, Burkart, and
Secchi (2004) estimated the cropland cash rental rates in the Upper Mississippi River Basin in
1997. Assuming the cropland cash rental rate to be a monotonic function of corn yield potential,
they express the per acre cash rental rate as a function of the corn yield estimate. Dhuyvetter
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and Kastens (2002) used a costs-based approach to determine equitable crop share and then
determined the cash equivalent amount of that crop share arrangement. The cash rental rates
are obtained after that value has been risk-adjusted. In the literature on seeking to measure the
incidence of agricultural subsidies on land rents, several papers have discussed different ways
of modeling farmland rental rates. Lence and Mishra (2003) modeled land rents as a function
of acreage-weighted corn and soybean revenues and government payments. Goodwin, Mishra,
and Ortalo-Magne´ (2004) developed regressions of cash rents against expected market earnings,
expected government payments, and indicators of urban pressure.
The land rent literature is distinct from, but strongly related to, the land price literature.
In that literature, land rent is the most widely accepted factor affecting farmland price. Early
studies found evidence to support a causal relationship between land rents and farmland prices.
They tended to conclude that residual returns, or rents, unidirectionally cause farmland prices
(Phipps 1984; Awokuse and Duke 2006). But because of the apparent divergence between
comparatively stable farm income levels and continuously increasing land prices, people have
sought other theoretical and empirical frameworks to help explain the farmland price movement.
Most studies of farmland pricing have assumed that the value of an income-producing asset
is the capitalized value of the current and future stream of earnings from owning the asset,
known as the constant discount rate present value model (CDR-PVM). Traditional time series
analysis also provided support for the validity of this linkage, in which changes in expected
returns to farming should explain changes in farmland prices. However, studies found that
the CDR-PVM may not be appropriate for pricing farmland. Falk (1991) found that although
farmland price and rent movements are highly correlated, price movements are not consistent
with the implications of CDR-PVM. Tegene and Kuchler (1993) also rejected the present value
model of land price. Lence and Miller (1999) didn’t reject the CDR-PVM in the presence
of typical transaction costs, and thus showed that the CDR-PVM is consistent with typical
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transaction costs assuming a one-period holding horizon.
The focus of this study is on the farmland rental market instead of the asset market. Com-
pared with land prices in the asset market, land rents more likely reflect optimal pricing behav-
ior, as they are less vulnerable to asset bubbles and present less severe transaction costs issues.
Although some progress has been made toward finding the relationship between land rents and
land prices, the literature has not fully investigated the nature and determinants of land rents.
A better grasp of the fundamentals of farmland cash rents might help us better understand
land pricing issues. Thus, there is a need to examine what factors influence the level of land
rents and how land rents respond to changes in exogenous variables. In this study, a unique
data set of local cash rental rates is exploited. It consists of county-level cash rental rates for
the state of Iowa from 1987 to 2005. The data were collected from an annual survey conducted
by Iowa State University Extension. It appears to be unique because, to our knowledge, no
other consistently collected county-level data covers any state in the United States.1
Our contributions are three-fold. First, we find the short-run determination of cash rental
rates in Iowa. In particular we estimate how they are affected by output/input prices, soil
quality, relative location, and other county-specific factors. We also find that cash rents go up
by $79 for a $1 change of corn price in the short run. The marginal value of cropland quality
is about $1.05, as represented by the row-crop corn suitability rating index. And ethanol
plants are not found to have a statistically significant local effect on cash rental rates, as their
effects are largely channeled through national futures prices. Scale of local livestock industry
and adoption rate of genetically engineered crops have significant impacts on local cash rental
rates. Our second contribution is to contrast short- and long-run responses to corn prices. The
possible changes of land rents is approximately $109-$114 for a $1 change in corn price, which
1Most of the other rental rates collections have either county-level data for shorter periods of time or long
time series data but only across fewer statistics regions. For example, University of Minnesota Extension has
collected county-level data from 2002 to 2007; University of Nebraska Extension has data for 1981-2007, but
only by agricultural statistics districts.
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could be reached in three to four years. The first-year increase in land rents will be around $80
on average, which is consistent with our estimation result in the short-run analysis. Adjustment
paths to the long-run equilibrium vary considerably across the state.
Our third contribution is to provide evidence on the validity of the Ricardian rent theory
(RRT) in Ricardo’s original and classical application, namely, in the farmland rental market.
We believe we are the first to do so. Different from farmland in the arid West, where water
rights are important, deep-soiled, well-watered farmland in rural Iowa is close to a “commodity”
in crop production. Hence, our cash rental rates data are close to ideal for the purpose of testing
the theory. In the short-run analysis, the RRT has been straightforwardly applied to farmland
rental markets. It seems to handle the observed hedonic characteristics fairly well, giving
plausible explanations for the determinants of local cash rental rates. But in the analysis of
rent responses to a $1 increase in corn price, it seems to have failed. By contrast with the
average value of $135 predicted by the theory, the rent response in the short run is estimated
to be $80 from the variable profit function. The low estimation result may be due to inertia in
leasing contract re-negotiations. Inertia can be explained by relationship-specific investments,
community ties, and other related issues.
Hence, in addition to contemporaneous and static estimation, we also apply long-term,
dynamic analysis. We obtain the long-run price effect of $109-$114, which still doesn’t fully
cover the theoretical value. We speculate that part of the reason for the discrepancy may be
that intellectual property rights owned by seed suppliers provide them with bargaining power,
so that they benefit in the process of cash rents allocation. In other words, the bargaining
assumptions underlying the RRT may not be valid. And some of the disparity may also be
explained by price and income supports provided by government programs, which may eliminate
cash rents responses to output price movements when prices are low.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, a model of farmland cash rental rates is developed
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using the variable profit function framework. A more detailed description of data follows.
Then we present the estimation method for a random effects model that takes into account
spatial and temporal autocorrelations. We also explain and analyze the estimation results.
The dynamic effects of corn prices on cash rental rates are examined. Finally, concluding
remarks are presented.
Methods
Consider a tenant farmer facing a multiple output production technology that has M variable
outputs and inputs denoted by yi, i = 1, 2, ...,M . Here, outputs are positive, yi > 0, and
inputs are negative, yi < 0. There are also N fixed inputs denoted by zh, h = 1, 2, ..., N . At
the beginning of a production period, he/she rents land, which is in fixed supply in a certain
region. The tenancy involves a formal contractual agreement, and the duration of a contract is
for a year, which is renewable and renegotiable annually. In the production period, the tenant
farmer makes all the input and production decisions. He/she also pays a fixed cash rental rate
to the landowner. Following the RRT, land rent is the highest bid a tenant can afford to pay
for the use of the land. It is the rental value, which will make the tenant farmer indifferent
between farming and not farming.
Let R be the fixed cash rental rate, pi, i = 1, 2, ...,M be the output/input prices, and let
xl, l = 1, 2, ..., L denote a number of region-specific factors. The time variable t is included to
proxy technological change. For Q, the set of technically feasible output and input choices, the
cash rental rate for one unit of land is determined by
R(p; z,x, t) = pi(p; z,x, t) = max
{
M∑
i=1
piyi; (y; z,x, t) ∈ Q
}
.
Here, y, p, z, and x are the vectors of the outputs/inputs, output/input prices, fixed inputs,
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and region-specific factors, respectively. Thus, rent is the profit, or residual farm return (farm
return less variable costs), obtained from the use of rented land given the production possibilities
set Q.
The cash rental rate R(p; z,x, t) has the following properties (Chambers 1988, p. 120), which
ensure that a one-to-one relationship exists between the production technology and its dual
transformation: (1) homogeneous of degree one in p; and (2) non-decreasing (non-increasing)
and convex in pi if i is an output (input). The convexity of the cash rental rate function in prices
pi, i = 1, 2, ...,M requires that the Hessian matrix with element ∂
2pi/∂pi∂pj, i, j = 1, 2, ...,M
be positive semi-definite.
To examine the determinants of local cash rental rates and obtain a set of output supply,
variable input demand and fixed input shadow price equations, we need to adopt a flexible
functional form for the profit function, which is a second-order Taylor’s approximation to any
arbitrary functional form. The transcendental logarithmic function form (Chambers 1988, p.
180; Weaver 1983; McKay, Lawrence, and Vlastuin 1983) is employed for the cash rental rates
function and is written as
ln(R) = α0 +
M∑
i=1
αi ln(pi) +
1
2
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
γij ln(pi) ln(pj) +
N∑
h=1
βhzh +
1
2
N∑
h=1
N∑
k=1
φhkzhzk
+
M∑
i=1
N∑
h=1
δih ln(pi)zh +
M∑
i=1
φit ln(pi)t+
N∑
h=1
ϕhtzht+
L∑
l=1
ηlxl + φtt+
1
2
φttt
2(1)
The symmetry conditions need to be imposed to ensure the profit function is fully identifiable.
Linear homogeneity of cash rental rates function in prices pi, i = 1, 2, ...,M, requires further
restrictions. The restrictions are
(2) Symmetry: γij = γji, φhk = φkh.
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(3) Homogeneity:
M∑
i=1
αi = 1,
M∑
i=1
γij = 0,
M∑
i=1
φit = 0,
M∑
i=1
δih = 0.
We impose the linear homogeneity condition in p by normalizing all input/output prices
and price-related variables by one of the output prices, say, pM . Thus, equation (1) can be
rewritten as the following, where p∗ = (p1/pM , p2/pM , ..., pM−1/pM) and R∗ = R/pM .
ln(R∗) = α0 +
M−1∑
i=1
αi ln(p
∗
i ) +
1
2
M−1∑
i=1
M−1∑
j=1
γij ln(p
∗
i ) ln(p
∗
j) +
N∑
h=1
βhzh +
1
2
N∑
h=1
N∑
k=1
φhkzhzk
+
M−1∑
i=1
N∑
h=1
δih ln(p
∗
i )zh +
M−1∑
i=1
φit ln(p
∗
i )t+
N∑
h=1
ϕhtzht+
L∑
l=1
ηlxl + φtt+
1
2
φttt
2(4)
Equation (4) is estimated based on the data described in the next section.
Data
In this study, we used annual survey data of typical cash rental rates per acre of cropland for the
state of Iowa over the period 1987-2005 as reported in Iowa State University Extension (2007).
Copies of this survey were mailed to potential respondents in March. Potential respondents
were persons employed in one of the following occupations: (1) agricultural leaders, (2) real
estate brokers, (3) professional farm managers, (4) farmers, and (5) landowners. In the survey,
the respondents provide information based on their best judgments about typical cash rental
rates for cropland at the county level. The survey is to be mailed back by early May. For
each county, there are about 15-20 responses by individuals doing business in that county or a
neighboring county. This data set provides a reasonably accurate measure of typical cash rents
of corn and soybean farmland for Iowa counties.
While initiated in 1980, the actual survey data didn’t cover all 99 counties of Iowa until
1997. In order to ensure temporal variation in our panel data set, we choose the cash rental
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rates data covering 83 counties in Iowa.2 Among the total 99 counties, we include most of the
counties in northern and western Iowa. The 16 counties in the southeast corner of the state are
left out because of data limitations. Most of the missing counties started to collect cash rental
rates data after 1995. The cash rental rates for the 83 counties in 2005 are shown in figure 1.
We choose y =(corn, soybean, fertilizer) as the outputs and variable input; x =(soil quality,
distance indices to terminal market) as fixed inputs, where the distance indices are in both
south-north and east-west directions for each county. County-level scale of livestock industry,
local ethanol production effect, normalized distance to nearby metropolitan areas, and adoption
rate of genetically engineered crops are chosen as county-specific factors influencing local cash
rental rates. Each of these chosen variables and its relationship to local cash rental rates is now
discussed in greater detail.
Output and Input Prices
In Iowa, most corn is planted between April 20 and May 10. The optimum time to plant
varies from year to year; however, having planting done by mid-May is a goal most producers
strive to achieve (Iowa State University Extension 2001). Similarly, the planting time for
soybeans is from May 15 to June 1. Crops are harvested from October to November of the
same year. In each spring, the tenant farmer must make decisions on planting and input choices
as well as formulate marketing plans for the new crop year. They can observe and use price
information from the futures contracts expiring right after harvest time to formulate harvest
price expectations. On the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), the December contract for corn
and the November contract for soybeans are the first available futures contracts after harvest
time. Hence we use spring average prices of corn and soybean futures contracts as expected
output prices in our study. They are calculated as the average daily settlement prices for
2See the Appendix for detailed information about missing data, omitted counties, and data treatment.
10
the December (November) maturity futures contract during April for corn (soybeans).3 The
producer price index for nitrogen fertilizer is used as the input price, which can be found in the
ERS/USDA data set “U.S. Fertilizer Use and Price.”
Soil Quality
Soil quality is the capacity of the soil to function. Its critical functions for agricultural produc-
tion include sustaining productivity and biological activity, regulating and partitioning water
flow, filtering and buffering, and storing and cycling nutrients (Karlen et al. 1997). Besides
the corn suitability rating (CSR) index used in this study, traditional measures of soil qual-
ity include (1) land capability classes (LCC) and the prime farmland designation to measure
land capability and suitability, which have been collected in the National Resources Inventory
(NRI); (2) crop yield per acre to measure soil productivity; and (3) highly erodible land (HEL)
to measure soil erodibility (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1997).
The CSR is an index procedure developed in Iowa to rate each type of soil for its potential
row-crop productivity (Iowa State University Extension 2006b). The CSR considers average
weather conditions as well as frequency of use of the soil for row-crop production. Ratings
range from 100 for soils that have no physical limitations, occur on minimal slopes, and can be
continuously row-cropped, to as low as 5 for soils with severe limitations for row crops. Land
with a CSR rating below 65 is generally considered to be unsuitable for row crop production.
The CSR can be used to rate the potential yield of one soil against that of another over a
relatively long period of time. In our case, we assume the CSR remains unchanged over our
sampling period. Each soil type in Iowa has a CSR. By identifying the soil types and acres of
each soil type in a tract of land, a weighted average CSR can be computed for the tract.
We use the average row-crop CSR index to measure soil quality in this study, as reported
3The reason we use the average April price is explained in the next section.
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in Iowa State University Extension (2007). By assuming that best-quality farmland is put into
crop production, the county-level index is obtained by (1) sorting the acreage of each soil type
in a county by the CSR in descending order; (2) using the county’s actual crop planting acreage
to locate the cut-off point in the CSR series; and (3) multiplying the CSR at a given level above
the cut-off point by the corresponding acres, then dividing the result by the county’s planting
acreage. The average row-crop CSR index map of Iowa is shown in figure 2.
Since the CSR measures the general soil productivity, good corn farmland is also considered
to be good soybean land. Figure 2 illustrates that a large proportion of land in Iowa is high-
grade farmland and can be planted to crops. Most counties have an average row-crop CSR index
above 70. Farmland in North Central Iowa has higher quality than land elsewhere. Southern
Iowa has the worst quality farmland compared with the rest of the state, mainly because it
tends to have higher erodibility.
Distance to Terminal Market
We use the relative location of each county in both south-north and east-west directions to reflect
a county’s distance to terminal market and relative transportation cost. Counties located closer
to the Mississippi River have a transportation advantage since these locations provide better
access to international and domestic terminal markets. For farmers in these counties, it has
been beneficial to transport their harvest by waterway, the cheapest mode of transportation.
Taking advantage of the rectangle shapes and arrangement of most counties in Iowa, we identify
relative location using two distance indices in the south-north and east-west directions. The
relative distance indices for the southeast corner of the state (Lee County) are assumed to be 1
and 2.5, respectively. The numbers in parentheses in figure 3 are the distance indices we used
in this study.
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Scale of Livestock Industry
Iowa ranked seventh in cattle production in 2006. Cattle are raised all around the state. Iowa
also leads the nation in pork production, raising 25% of U.S. hogs in 2006. The livestock
industry has been the Iowa corn grower’s most important customer. Prior to the expansion of
the ethanol market, two-thirds of Iowa’s corn crop had gone to feed livestock. The presence of
livestock in a county should increase local demand for corn and thus increase cropland rental
prices. Also, the Iowa livestock industry generates large quantities of manure and other organic
residues. The vast majority of operations apply the waste directly to land owned or rented by
the operation or sell the manure to nearby areas. Availability of livestock manure is expected
to affect local cash rents.
We use total grain-consuming animal units in each county to represent a county’s scale of
livestock industry. An animal unit is a standard unit for comparing actual animal numbers for
the main types of livestock raised in Iowa, including cattle, hogs, and sheep/lambs. An animal
unit is based on the dry-weight quantity of feed consumed by the average milk cow during
the base period. We adopted a set of animal unit conversion factors, developed by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (1974), to relate feed consumption for each type of livestock to the
feed consumed by the average milk cow.
Data were obtained from various sources. The county-level annual cattle (1987-90, 2001-07),
hogs (1987-89), and sheep/lambs (1987-90) quantity data were downloaded from the website
of the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS 2007). The three years (1992, 1997 and
2002) of Census of Agriculture data from NASS are used to linearly interpolate the missing
data. Figure 4 shows total grain-consuming animal units for the sample counties in 2005.
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Ethanol Plant Effect
The effect ethanol plants have on corn price and basis has been an issue investigated in several
papers. McNew and Griffith (2005) examined the impact of ethanol plants on local grain
market prices by estimating the effects of 12 ethanol plants in the Midwest that opened in 2001
and 2002. They found that these new ethanol plants increased local grain prices, but markets
downstream from a new plant have a smaller price impact. Gallagher, Wisner, and Brubacker
(2006) conducted a cross-sectional price-location analysis for 270 cities and towns in Iowa in
spring 2003 to determine the impact of ethanol plants on the corn price surface. The results
showed that for four conventional non-farmer-owned firms, price increases as one gets closer
to the processing plants; while five of six farmer cooperatives failed to show any statistically
significant effect on nearby prices. Olson, Klein, and Taylor (2007) found the impact of ethanol
production on corn basis varies by district in South Dakota from $0.04 to $0.27 per bushel,
with a state average impact of $0.24 in 2005.
Iowa had an early start in corn-based ethanol production. By the end of 2006, there were
23 ethanol plants operating in 22 counties with total production capacity of 1.2 billion gallons,
as shown in table 1. In this study, a county’s index of ethanol plant effect is constructed by
summing its weights in corn supply areas over nearby ethanol plants using
Eit =
Nt∑
n=1
win(t).
Here win(t) is the proportion that county i has in the corn supply area of ethanol plant n at year
t. Each corn supply area is assumed to be a circle centered at the ethanol production facility
and to be proportional to the production capacity of that plant. Nt is total number of ethanol
plants in production at time t. All counties inside each corn supply area share the total supply,
i.e., the proportion ranges from 0 to 1 and the sum over all counties is 1. Following opening
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dates of ethanol plants, we construct the panel data of the effect of ethanol production on all
sample counties for the period 1987-2005. Figure 5 shows the ethanol plants in operation by the
end of 2005 and the corresponding corn supply areas, which are based on the map constructed
in Wisner (2006).
But the cash rents data may not be disaggregated enough, spatially and temporally, to fully
capture the local effect of ethanol plants. This may be especially true when an ethanol plant is
not located at the geographic center of a county. It is difficult to identify the true hinterland
of an ethanol plant, as it depends on fine local geography. Table 1 also shows that the vast
majority of ethanol production capacity came online since January 2004. This new capacity
has been spatially dispersed, but mainly in the North Central and Northwest of the state.
We also notice that ethanol demand for corn has affected the corn prices pattern across Iowa
since January 2006 (Hart 2007). Typically, by contrast with the strongest basis in East Iowa,
North Central and West Iowa tend to have the weakest basis, which is mainly determined by
transportation costs. This basis pattern is consistent with what we attempt to capture by the
distance to terminal market variable in this study. But many ethanol plants opened between
fall 2005 and fall 2006 and this is likely the reason for the basis shift in North Central and
Northwest Iowa. In short, we are not very confident about the variable’s ability to identify the
existence of this effect.
Urbanization Effect
Land price in the farmland market is greatly influenced by development pressure of accessible
urban areas (Shi, Phipps, and Colyer 1997). Livanis et al. (2006) showed that urban sprawl
has three important effects on farmland values: (1) it changes non-farm opportunities, (2) it
creates a speculative component, and (3) it can alter net agricultural returns. While Iowa is
not a rapidly developing state, urban expansion, together with other non-farming motives for
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purchases, are among the long-term factors influencing Iowa’s farmland market (Duffy 2004).
Closer proximity to big metropolitan areas generates stronger development pressures and could
possibly lead to higher cash rental rates.
The influence of urban development on local farmland rental markets should increase with
the size of urban population and decrease with the distance between two locations. Hence,
the urbanization influence of a metropolitan area on each county is measured by the distance
between them, normalized by the population in that area. The urbanization effect index for
county i is represented by the minimum value of all urbanization influences as
UEi = min
(
dij
nj
)
, ∀j
where dij is the distance between county i and metropolitan area j, j = 1, 2, ..., 10 in our case,
and nj is the population size of that metropolitan area.
By the ranking for population of metropolitan statistical areas the in U.S. (U.S. Census
Bureau 2000), the top 10 biggest metropolitan areas in Iowa are chosen. The included areas are
Omaha/Council Bluffs, Des Moines, Davenport/Moline/Rock Island, Cedar Rapids, Sioux Falls,
Waterloo/Cedar Falls, Sioux City, Iowa City, Dubuque, and Ames. Figure 6 shows locations
of chosen areas with population data from the U.S. Census 2000 in parentheses. Google Maps
data are used to measure the distances between the geographic center of each county and nearby
metropolitan areas.
Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops
Iowa farmers have adopted genetically engineered (GE) crops widely since their introduction in
1996. One of the most important benefits of GE crops has been to confer tolerance to herbicides
that are used for weed control (Byrne et al. 2004). Another important benefit of GE crops is
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to confer protection against insect pests. This class of crop trait could substantially improve
yields where pest damage is rampant and/or reduce use of chemical pesticides (Wu and Butz
2004).
Many field tests and farm surveys have examined the yield and cost effects of using GE
crops. The majority of the results show that GE crops produce slightly higher yields than
conventional crops. Based on 1996-1998 Agricultural Resources Management Survey data, the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has observed that adopters of Bt corn have obtained
higher yields than non-adopters. Fernandez-Cornejo and Caswell (2006) point out that currently
available GE crops do not increase the yield potential of a hybrid variety. However, GE crops
can prevent yield losses as compared with non-GE hybrids, particularly when pest infestation
is high. Pesticide use rates on corn and soybeans have declined since the introduction of GE
corn and soybeans in 1996.
The labor savings obtained from less weeding and pesticide spraying leads to a drop in labor
demand for a given level of output. With a fixed amount of labor, machinery input, and time
available in a planting season, a higher adoption rate of GE crops is expected to result in excess
production capacity in the short run. In turn, this should motivate tenant farmers to compete
for more farmland through bidding up cash rental rates. Hence, we expect that adoption of GE
crops should have a significant positive effect on cash rental rates. State-level adoption rates,
as given by total planting acreage data, are drawn from the ERS/USDA data set “Adoption of
Genetically Engineered Crops in the U.S.”
Estimation
Since cash rental rates are not accounting profits, we do not have a breakdown of profit sources.
Therefore it is inappropriate to use the commonly applied seemingly unrelated regressions
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(SUR) estimation procedure to jointly estimate the parameters in output supply and input
demand share equations. Using soybean price as the nume´raire price, we consider the estimation
of equation (4) based on the panel data of 83 counties over 1987 to 2005.
In dealing with this panel data set, we explicitly take into account (1) spatial autocorrela-
tion due to neighboring counties; (2) temporal autocorrelation due to time-lagged behavior of
farmland rental agreements; and (3) individual heterogeneity across counties. The county-level
data are organized by spatial units of observations. The existence of spatial dependence follows
from the existence of a variety of spatial interaction phenomena. The estimations errors of these
contiguous counties are correlated. The test result for spatial autocorrelation based on Moran’s
I statistic (Anselin 1988, p. 101) is ZI = 80.530 and statistically significant. Farmland rental
agreements are also liable to exhibit lagged behavior over time. Temporal autocorrelation in
the error term is expected. Applying the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
(Wooldridge 2002, p. 282), we get the value of the F -statistic as 296.715, which is statistically
significant and confirms our expectation.
Next, we account for heterogeneity across counties by using the random effects estimator.
To justify the random effects model, a one-sided Breusch and Pagan’s Lagrange Multiplier
test (Greene 2003, p. 224) for the null hypothesis of no random effects, σ2µ = 0, yields a χ
2
1
test statistic of 277.82, which is statistically significant. However, we are still concerned about
possible correlation between the regressors and the random effects. To address this concern,
we compute a Hausman test statistic for misspecification (Greene 2003, p. 301), based on
the difference between the fixed effects and random effects estimators. This yields a χ220 test
statistic of 1.28 with P > χ220 = 0.99, which is not statistically significant. Therefore, we fail
to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity, and the random effects estimator is found to be
consistent and asymptotically efficient.
With these complications, there is no ready-to-use procedure to estimate equation (4). Fol-
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lowing the likelihood function derivation in Baltagi et al. (2004), we extend the estimation
procedure proposed by Elhorst (2003) to a panel data random effects model accounting for
both spatial and temporal autocorrelations.4 Our panel data regression model is specified as
(5) yti = X
′
tiβ + uti
where i = 1, ..., N denotes the cross-section dimension and t = 1, ..., T denotes the time series
dimension. The cash rental rate on the ith county for the tth time period is yti. The K
dimensional vector of explanatory variables defined in equation (4) is Xti.
By assumption, the disturbance term uti has random county effects, spatially autocorrelated
residual disturbances, and first-order serially correlated residual disturbances. Employing a
random effects model, we have the disturbance term for time t:
(6) ut = µ+ t
where ut = (ut1, ..., utN)
′. And µ = (µ1, µ2, ..., µN)′ denotes the unobserved individual ran-
dom effects for the counties. We assume µ
iid∼ N(0, σ2µ) to be independent of . Vector
t = (t1, ..., tN)
′ represents the residual disturbance and can be expressed as
(7) t = δWt + νt, and νt = ρνt−1 + et
where νt = (νt1, ..., νtN)
′ and et = (et1, ..., etN)′. The spatial autocorrelation coefficient satisfying
|δ| < 1 is δ, while ρ is the temporal autocorrelation coefficient in the range of (−1, 1).
W is the spatial contiguity matrix and is constructed based on the notion of binary conti-
guity between spatial units, i.e., two counties having a common border of non-zero length are
4The codes are modified from the Matlab code provided by Dr. Elhorst, which is for the random effects
model with spatial autocorrelation and can be found at http://www.regroningen.nl/irios.html.
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considered to be contiguous. A value of 1 is assigned for the corresponding matrix element;
otherwise the element is 0. The diagonal elements of W are all 0 since one spatial unit can’t
be its own neighbor. And the rows of the W matrix are standardized so that they sum to one.
With the normality assumption of eti ∼ N(0, σ2e), we have νit ∼ N (0, σ2e/(1− ρ2)) by
equation (7). Let B = IN − δW , θ2 = σ
2
µ
σ2e
, α =
√
1+ρ
1−ρ , d
2 = (ιαT )
′ιαT with ι
α
T = (α, ι
′
T−1),
and assign ιT as a vector of ones of dimension T . The log-likelihood function for the panel data
regression model can be written as5
l(β, σ2e , δ, ρ, θ
2) = −NT
2
ln(2piσ2e) +
1
2
N ln(1− ρ2)− 1
2
N∑
i=1
ln
(
1 + d2(1− ρ)2θ2(1− δwi)2
)
+T
N∑
i=1
ln(1− δwi)− 1
2σ2e
T∑
t=1
e∗∗
′
t e
∗∗
t(8)
where e∗∗t = y
∗∗
t −X∗∗t β, and
y∗∗t = Py
∗
α +B(y
∗
t − y∗α) = (IN − δW )y∗t + (Py∗α − (IN − δW )y∗α)
X∗∗t = (IN − δW )X∗t +
(
PX
∗
α − (IN − δW )X∗α
)
(9)
Here, wi is the ith characteristic root of W , y
∗
α is the “α” average of yt, i.e., y
∗
α = y
′
t × ιαT/(α+
T − 1), and X∗α is similarly defined. P is such that P ′P = (d2(1− ρ)2θ2IN + (B′B)−1)−1. Here
P = Λ−
1
2R, where R is an N × N matrix in which the ith column is the characteristic vector
ri of (d
2(1− ρ)2θ2IN + (B′B)−1)−1. Note that ri is the same as the characteristic vector of the
spatial weight matrix W . And Λ is an N × N diagonal matrix with the ith diagonal element
being ci = d
2(1− ρ)2θ2 + 1/(1− δwi)2.
5See Baltagi et al. (2004) and Elhorst (2003) for details on a very similar derivation.
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Estimates of β and σ2e are then solved as follows:
(10) βˆ =
(
X∗∗
′
X∗∗
)−1 (
X∗∗
′
y∗∗
)
and σˆ2e =
N∑
i=1
e∗∗
′
t e
∗∗
t /NT
Substituting βˆ and σˆ2e into the log-likelihood function (8), the concentrated log-likelihood func-
tion of δ, ρ and θ2 is obtained:
l(δ, ρ, θ2) = Constant− NT
2
ln
(
T∑
t=1
e∗∗
′
t e
∗∗
t
)
− 1
2
N∑
i=1
ln
(
1 + d2(1− ρ)2θ2(1− δwi)2
)
+
1
2
N ln(1− ρ2) + T
N∑
i=1
ln(1− δwi)(11)
In summary, the estimation procedure is as follows:
1. Choose the initial values of δ, ρ and θ2 in the specified ranges.
2. Given δ, ρ and θ2, solve for βˆ from equation (10), which is the generalized least square
(GLS) estimator of β.
3. Substitute the βˆ obtained in step (2) into equation (11), then use optimization techniques
to obtain maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of δ, ρ and θ2.
4. Iterate between step (2) and step (3) until results satisfy a predetermined convergence
criterion.
Price Data Selection
Before we get into discussion of the estimation results, one point that needs to be made clear
concerns why we use average April futures price as expected output price in our estimation. The
actual cash rental rates data collection happens in spring (April) while most rental contracts
are entered into in late summer (August) of the previous year. In the annual cash rental rates
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survey, experts are asked to provide information about “current, typical” cash rental rates
in their counties. Rental contracts are sometimes renegotiated after major price movements.
What happens is that the landowner and tenant farmer sometimes agree to wait until after
January to set the rent in the event that prices rise significantly after September 1st. It is not
clear whether the experts answer the question with reference to prior August rental agreements
or to the market environment pertaining at the time of the survey response.
In order to further determine the information content of cash rental rates data, we follow
the idea of a comprehensive specification test (Greene 2003, p. 154). In our case, Model 1 is
the model using average year t April price for the year t harvest futures contract price, while
Model 0 uses average year t−1 August price for the year t harvest contract price. Other model
specifications are the same as the variable profit function structure in equation (4).
In the unrestricted model, we assume that the actual price in forming the expected output
price takes the form of a weighted average of April and August prices, as
κ ln(pApr) + (1− κ) ln(pAug).
Here, pApr and pAug are the average April price in year t and August price in year t − 1,
respectively, and κ is a weight between 0 and 1. Model 0 assumes κ = 0 and Model 1 assumes
κ = 1. We use the concentrated log-likelihood function (11) to find the maximum likelihood
estimate of κ using grid search. This is a simplified estimation method since κ cannot be
separately estimated with other parameters in equation (11). The result in table 2 shows that
the maximum likelihood estimate of κ is 1, which means that model 1 is the appropriate model
for the estimation. Variable descriptions and estimates of the parameters in equation (4) are
given in tables 3 and 4. The parameter estimates for the nume´raire output, soybeans, are
derived using the symmetry and homogeneity constraints in equations (2)-(3).
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Analysis of Estimation Results
From the estimation results, the coefficients of spatial autocorrelation (δ), temporal autocor-
relation (ρ), and the fraction of variance due to unobservable effects (θ2) are all statistically
significant at the 1% level, which confirms our model specification tests. Furthermore, the point
estimate of spatial autocorrelation is 0.789 and highly significant. This indicates the existence
of important spatial dependencies in the data. The point estimate of the temporal autocorrela-
tion is 0.371 and is also highly significant. This confirms the existence of time-lagged behavior
in farmland rental agreements.
All the coefficients of region-specific factors have intuitively correct signs. Scale of livestock
industry, normalized distance to metropolitan areas, and adoption rate of GE crops all signif-
icantly affect the local cash rental rates. As expected, total animal units and adoption of GE
crops considerably increase what tenant farmers pay to landowners. The urbanization effect
is estimated as -0.023 and is marginally significant. This indicates that farmland rents are
somewhat higher for counties closer to big metropolitan areas, as expected. That the effect is
only marginally significant should not be surprising, as Iowa is a rural state, and county-level
reporting units are likely insufficiently disaggregated to catch any small-city effects. The esti-
mated coefficient of ethanol production effect is 0.011 and is not significant, which means that
production of ethanol plants in Iowa have not been found to have a local effect on cash rental
rates. We have already included national futures prices as expected output prices, accounting
for the global effect of ethanol production. So ethanol production impacts local farmland rental
markets mainly through the national futures price.
If the RRT applies, then Hotelling’s Lemma allows profit share equations to be obtained as
(12) Si =
∂ln(R)
∂ln(pi)
=
piyi
R
, i = 1, 2, ...,M.
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where Si is the share of net output i in variable profit. Here, Si > 0 if pi is an output price and
Si < 0 if pi is an input price.
For the fixed input, we have the similar derivation as
(13) sh =
∂ln(R)
∂zh
=
wzh
R
, h = 1, 2, ..., N.
where wzh is the shadow price of fixed input zh. And the fixed input share equations can be
defined as
zhwzh
R
= zh
∂ln(R)
∂zh
= zhsh, h = 1, 2, ..., N.
Applying (12) and (13) to equation (1) yields
Si = αi +
M∑
j=1
γij ln(pj) +
N∑
h=1
δihzh + φitt, i = 1, 2, ...,M.
sh = βh +
N∑
k=1
φhkzk +
M∑
i=1
δih ln(pi) + ϕhtt, h = 1, 2, ..., N.
wzh = R
(
βh +
N∑
k=1
φhkzk +
M∑
i=1
δih ln(pi) + ϕhtt
)
, h = 1, 2, ..., N.(14)
In our case, the estimated shares for outputs and fixed inputs are positive at sample means
of explanatory variables. And the variable input, fertilizer, has negative estimated share. So
the corresponding translog profit function satisfies the monotonicity requirement. The average
shadow price of soil quality is about $1.05, and the average shadow prices for relative location
in the North (BN) and West (BW) are $0.22 and $1.11, respectively. These computations are
performed at the sample means for all related variables.
For the translog functional form, the curvature constraint at the approximation point implies
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that the following matrix is positive semi-definite:
H1 =

γ11 + α
2
1 − α1 γ12 + α1α2 · · · γ1M + α1αM
γ12 + α1α2 γ22 + α
2
2 − α2 · · · γ2M + α2αM
...
...
. . .
...
γM1 + αMα1 γM2 + αMα2 · · · γMM + α2M − αM

It is not uncommon for this curvature property to be violated in empirical applications (Diew-
ert and Wales 1987). In our case, the estimated translog profit function doesn’t satisfy this
curvature condition at the approximation point.
The price elasticities of variable input/output i with respect to price pj are defined as
ii =
γii
Si
+ Si − 1 i = 1, 2, ...,M.
ij =
γij
Si
+ Sj i, j = 1, 2, ...,M, i 6= j.(15)
Here, ii is the elasticity of supply (demand) if i is an output (variable input).
The elasticities of fixed input zh’s shadow price wzh with respect to input/output price pi
are
(16) ςih = Si + δih, i = 1, 2, ...,M, h = 1, 2, ..., N.
The price responses of fixed input zh with respect to quantity of the fixed input zk are
6
ζhh = R
(
s2h + φhh
)
h = 1, 2, ..., N.
ζhk = R (shsk + φhk) h, k = 1, 2, ..., N, h 6= k.(17)
6We calculate responses of prices instead of price elasticities because of the ordinal nature of the fixed input
variables, the CSR index and the two relative location indices. It makes more sense to measure the responses
to unit changes, rather than percentage changes, of these discrete variables.
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Here, ζhh is the response of the shadow price of fixed input zh to a unit change in its quantity.
The responses of variable quantity yi to the quantity of fixed input zh are
(18) ξih =
R
pi
(Sish + δih), i = 1, 2, ...,M, h = 1, 2, ..., N.
The elasticity of supply and demand are obtained by evaluating equation (17), using parameter
estimates in table 2 and appropriate sample means of output shares and exogenous variables.
Table 5 reports these elasticities estimation results evaluated at sample average over the
1997-2005 period. This period is chosen because the 1996 so-called Freedom to Farm Act
freed acres up to follow market signals, and we expect this might make a difference in farmers’
responses. Estimated own-price elasticities of supply and demand have signs consistent with
the implication of profit maximization, with ii being positive for both outputs and negative for
the variable input. The estimated own price elasticities of corn and soybeans are 1.06 and 2.72,
respectively. They indicate considerable short-run flexibility in the outputs. While the partial
elasticity of soybeans with respect to the price of corn is -0.38, that of corn with respect to the
soybeans price is 0.35. The correlation between corn and soybean futures prices is 0.75 over
the sample period. This comparatively high correlation may be responsible for the unexpected
soybean price elasticities.
The results also suggest that corn output is very responsive to fertilizer price, with the
elasticity being -1.41, while the own price elasticity of fertilizer is -1.49. The responses of corn,
soybean supply, and fertilizer demand to a one-unit change in the CSR are 0.52, 0.24 and 0.07,
respectively. In terms of shadow price response to endowment of fixed input, a one-unit increase
in the CSR decreases its shadow price by $0.07. And one more county in the east-west direction
leads to a $0.72 drop in the corresponding shadow price, while that amount for the south-north
direction is $2.46. Although the absolute values of these elasticities are large, none are entirely
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unreasonable. As the estimates are predicated on the RRT, they provide some evidence on its
validity.
The estimated yields of corn and soybeans derived from the profit share equation (12) are
79 bushels and 29 bushels per acre, respectively.7 By the RRT, in which the response of cash
rents to a marginal increase in corn price is equal to the estimated yield in quantity, the current
period cash rent increase corresponding to a $1 increase in corn price is also about $79. Some
reflection on the economic foundations of this response is warranted. Perhaps a change in
output price should have both short- and long-term effects on cash rental rates. In other words,
past changes in corn prices should affect present cash rental rates, but the incidence of the
effects may be distributed across several future time periods. While higher corn prices drive up
the local cash rental rates, contract re-negotiation in local markets may exhibit inertia due to
community ties, relationship-specific investments (RSIs), and market power issues.
Because the process of contract enforcement is typically difficult and costly, enduring per-
sonal relationships and community ties are sometimes important for landlords when selecting
tenants. It is also well recognized in the literature that RSIs are positively related with contract
duration, especially for fixed cash rent contracts (e.g., Joskow 1987; Bandiera 2005; Jacoby and
Mansuri 2006). Among the four types of RSIs recognized in Williamson (1983), non-salvageable
physical specific assets and human specific assets are most relevant to farmland rental markets.
Tenant farmers may make investments in equipment and machinery that are specific to the
rented land and may lose values in alternative uses. Some human capital investments, such as
learning about capabilities of given land, are tied to specific land and cannot be easily trans-
ferred to another landlord-tenant relationship. There are similar RSIs on the landlord side as
well. Thus, landlord and tenant farmer more likely prefer a longer-term contract and may be
reluctant to repeatedly negotiate leasing contracts over time. So the adjustment of cash rental
7These yields are much lower than typical Iowa yields. We will discuss implications of the disparity at a
later juncture.
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rates to long-run equilibrium is expected be a long-term process, which is the topic we turn to
in the next section.
Long-Run Price Effect Analysis
In this section, the parameter of interest is the average long-run effect of expected corn price
on cash rental rates. An error correction model (ECM) is used to estimate this long-run effect.
The ECM is a class of models with a general form equivalent to the traditional autoregressive
distributed lag (ARDL) models (Greene 2003, p. 579). We are going to look at two dimensions
of the relationship between cash rental rates and expected corn prices: the long-run effect; and
the potentially heterogeneous, dynamic adjustment path for each county. To be consistent with
what we have done above, we consider the long-run effect by analyzing the relationship between
cash rental rates and corn futures prices where both are normalized by the corresponding
soybean futures prices over the period of 1987-2005.
In the literature, there are two commonly used estimation procedures for applying panel data
to obtain long-run effects. The first one is the mean group (MG) estimator, which was proposed
by Pesaran and Smith (1995). The MG procedure is to obtain a distinct regression estimate for
each group or county in our case, and then average the coefficients over all groups to obtain the
average effect. Pesaran and Smith (1995) showed that the MG estimation produces consistent
estimates of the average of the parameters. The second procedure is referred to as pooled mean
group (PMG) estimation, and was introduced in Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999). It allows
the intercepts, short-run coefficients, and error variances to differ across groups but constrains
the long-run multipliers to be the same. It has been shown to generate consistent estimates of
short-run and long-run coefficients.
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Unit Root Tests
Before applying the estimation procedures to our long-run price effect analysis, we turn to using
various stationarity or unit root tests on the data series in order to better understand their
time series properties.
Individual Time Series Unit Root Tests
In the following sub-section, we randomly choose Floyd County as an example to illustrate
unit root tests for the individual county’s data series. The purpose of the unit root tests is to
examine whether the time series is a stationary process with a high degree of autocorrelation,
or a random walk with drift. We applied the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Greene
2003, p. 643) and KPSS test (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992) on both the soybean normalized corn
prices and the soybean normalized cash rents series.
The null hypothesis of the ADF test is that the series contains a unit root, and the alternative
is that the series is level stationary. The test result is conditional on the model specification,
including whether or not to impose a constant and a lagged difference. The lags of the first
difference of the variable are included to account for possible serial autocorrelation. The ADF
test has low statistical power to reject a unit root. And the statistical power is further reduced
with the addition of the lagged difference. The KPSS test, in contrast to the ADF test, takes
stationarity as the null hypothesis. It also suffers from the low power problem. We include
both a constant and lag one first difference term for the tests. The results are summarized in
table 6.
From the results, we fail to reject the null hypotheses for both series at the 5% significance
level in ADF tests. In KPSS tests, we fail to reject the null hypothesis for both series at the
1% significance level. The test results indicate that different unit root tests lead to ambiguous
and inconclusive outcomes on the existence of unit root in the series. In applying stationarity
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or unit root tests to a small sample, the non-rejection of a null hypothesis doesn’t necessarily
lead to acceptance. With 19 observations in each data series that we are examining, failing to
reject the null hypothesis is a relatively weak outcome. In other words, the test results are not
strong enough for us to draw a conclusion on the properties of the data. In order to get more
reliable results, we employ panel data unit root tests to further investigate this issue on cash
rental rates.
The issue of whether agricultural commodity futures prices are stationary or not is still
controversial. While some of the empirical evidence finds unit root behavior in these prices,
others have concluded that prices are stationary. Dorfman (1993) inferred that most of the
commodity futures price series, which are traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME),
are stationary. Liu (2005) tested stationarity in daily corn, soybean meal, and lean hog futures
prices traded on the CBOT. He found that all three futures price series do not reject the
existence of a unit root. Wang and Tomek (2007) point out that ADF test outcomes are
influenced by the model specification underlying the hypothesis test. This is one of the reasons
why different studies may get conflicting results. We are not going to explore this topic further
since it is not a necessary assumption to make in carrying out our analysis. We prefer to assume
the stationarity of normalized corn futures price in our study because there is no compelling
theoretical reason for the unit root behavior in the normalized corn futures price.
Panel Unit Root Tests for Cash Rental Rates
Panel data unit root tests have been proposed as alternative more powerful tests than those
based on individual time series. The Levin-Lin-Chu test (Levin, Lin, and Chu 2002), hereafter
denoted by LLC, the Im-Pesaran-Shin test (Im, Pesaran, and Shin 2003), hereafter denoted by
IPS, and the cross-sectionally augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Pesaran 2007), hereafter denoted
by CADF, are applied on the panel data of cash rental rates. Both the LLC and IPS tests
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assume that the individual processes are cross-sectionally independent. In the CADF test, the
standard ADF regressions are augmented with the cross-sectional averages of lagged levels and
first-differences of the individual series to account for the cross-sectional dependence.
Under the null hypothesis, the LLC test assumes that all series in the panel are non-stationary
against the alternative that all series are stationary. It can be applied for homogeneous panels,
i.e., the autoregressive coefficients for unit roots are assumed to be the same across sections.
Under the null hypothesis of the IPS test, all series in the panel are assumed to be non-
stationary. The alternative hypothesis allows for a fraction of the series in the panel to be
stationary. The IPS test allows for heterogeneous panels. The CADF test can be applied
to heterogenous panels with cross-sectional dependence. The null hypothesis assumes that all
series are non-stationary. Baltagi, Bresson, and Pirotte (2007) studied the performance of panel
unit root tests when spatial effects are present that account for cross-sectional correlation.
Their findings show that tests like the CADF test, which explicitly allow for cross-sectional
dependence, have better performance than other classical panel unit root tests that assume
cross-sectional independence.
The test results in table 7 show that the null hypotheses of non-stationarity for all three
tests are rejected. Compared with unit root tests of individual time series, panel unit root
tests provide stronger evidence that the cash rental rates are stationary over the sample period.
There is no gain from applying panel unit root tests on the normalized corn price series since
it does not have cross-sectional variation.
Panel Analysis of Long-Run Price Effect
In this section, we apply MG and PMG estimation procedures to the ECM to analyze the
average long-run price effect. In particular, this approach allows us to simultaneously investi-
gate both long-run relationships and short-run dynamic adjustment toward equilibrium after a
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change in expected corn price.
In the ECM, the error correction rate, the short-run effect, and their standard errors are es-
timated directly. The long-term multiplier can also be easily calculated. More importantly, we
expect the long-run equilibrium relationships between cash rental rates and expected corn price
to be the same across all counties, because of similar climatological conditions, contiguous lo-
cations, and technology spillovers affecting them in analogous ways. The individual adjustment
path of each county to the long-run equilibrium may differ considerably because of county-
specific factors. For example, counties with better-quality farmland and those closer to a big
metropolitan area may tend to adjust quicker and more completely to price changes. While
imposing the same long-run multipliers, PMG estimation allows for variability among short-run
coefficients. This structure in turn allows the dynamic specification, including the individual
lag structure, to differ across counties. The MG estimation doesn’t impose any parameter
constraint, allowing all parameters to vary freely.
Following Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999), we formulate the fixed effects panel data model
in the error correction representation as
(19) 4yit = αiyi,t−1 + βixi,t−1 +
p−1∑
j=1
γij4yi,t−j +
q−1∑
j=0
λij4xi,t−j + µi + εit
where t = 1, 2, ..., T , and i = 1, 2, ..., N ; yit and xit are the dependent variable and explanatory
variable for county i at time t; 4yit = yit− yi,t−1, 4xit = xit− xi,t−1, 4yi,t−j and 4xi,t−j are j
period lagged values of yit and xit; and µi represents the fixed effect. The disturbances εit are
assumed to be independently distributed across i and t with mean 0 and variance σ2i > 0. In
our case the dependent variable, yit, is the normalized cash rental rate of county i at time t and
xit is the normalized corn futures price over t. There is no cross-sectional variation in futures
prices data.
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The long-run relationship between yit and xit can be defined by
yit = θixit + νit, i = 1, 2, ..., N
where θi = − βiαi are the long-run coefficients, and νit is assumed to be a stationary process.
Equation (19) can be rewritten as
(20) 4yit = αiνi,t−1 +
p−1∑
j=1
γij4yi,t−j +
q−1∑
j=0
λij4xi,t−j + µi + εit
where νi,t−1 is the error correction term, hence, αi is the error correction coefficient measuring
the adjustment speed toward the long-run equilibrium.
By imposing the long-run homogeneity constraint, θi = θ, i = 1, 2, ..., N, PMG estimation
constrains the long-run coefficients to be the same. The pooled maximum likelihood estima-
tion is applied for parameter estimation. Derivation and computation details are provided in
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999).8 Because of the linear nature of (19), we can obtain the PMG
estimators by
αˆPMG =
1
N
N∑
i=1
α˜i, βˆPMG =
1
N
N∑
i=1
β˜i, γˆjPMG =
1
N
N∑
i=1
γ˜ij, j = 1, 2, ..., p− 1,
and
λˆjPMG =
1
N
N∑
i=1
λ˜ij, j = 0, 1, ..., q − 1, θˆPMG = θ˜.
The MG estimation allows for heterogeneity among all the parameters in incorporating
8The codes are modified from the Gauss code provided in the paper, which can be found at http://www.
econ.cam.ac.uk/faculty/pesaran.
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county-specific long-run and short-run effects. The estimates of the parameters are as follows:
αˆMG =
1
N
N∑
i=1
αˆi, βˆMG =
1
N
N∑
i=1
βˆi, γˆjMG =
1
N
N∑
i=1
γˆij, j = 1, 2, ..., p− 1,
and
λˆjMG =
1
N
N∑
i=1
λˆij, j = 0, 1, ..., q − 1, θˆMG = 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
− βˆi
αˆi
)
.
where αˆi, βˆi, γˆij, and λˆij are the OLS estimates for an individual county using (19).
The lag order was first chosen for each county on the unrestricted model by using the Akaike
information criterion (AIC),9 subject to a maximum lag of 3. Then, the long-run homogeneity
constraint was imposed using these AIC-determined lag orders. Table 8 shows the MG and
PMG estimation results. The results for individual counties are not reported because of limited
space. They are all statistically significant. The two sets of estimates, MG and PMG, of the
error correction coefficient and short-run coefficient are all significant with similar results. The
long-run multipliers are all significant, while the estimates are different to some extent.
Figure 7 reports long-run effects obtained from the MG estimation procedure over sample
counties. It demonstrates that significant long-run price effects are present in most of the
counties, and they vary considerably across the state. Also, the distribution of the long-run
effects is in line with that of historical cash rental rates. This observation is confirmed by the
OLS regression results reported in table 9, which suggests that the county cash rental rate for
2005 is highly significant in explaining the variation of long-run price effects. It may be that
long-run effects and historical cash rental rates are related in some way to counties’ specific
factors. Adjustment speeds, represented by the error correction coefficients obtained from the
PMG estimation procedure, are reported in figure 8. They range from 0.3421 to 1. In some
counties, the error correction coefficients are 1 since the AIC chooses the static model as the
9Using Bayesian Information Criterion (SBC), we get similar results. In some cases, because of SBC’s
heavier penalty for lost degrees of freedom, it will lead to a simpler model than AIC (Greene 2003, p. 565).
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best-fitting model for them. An adjustment speed value of 1 means that cash rental rates
will adjust to long-run equilibrium instantaneously. The regression results in table 9 implicate
higher soil quality, which is statistically significant at the 1% level, as a factor in explaining
heterogeneity in speeds of adjustment. Figures 2 and 8 lend some support to the hypothesis
that sluggish responses to price movement are due to thinner cropland rental markets, where
good land is comparatively scarce.
The long-run price effect analysis provides us with an answer to the following question: If
corn price were to increase $1 in the year t, how would it affect cash rental rates? In general,
changes in the corn price have both short-term and long-term effects on cash rental rates. In the
long run, the possible size of the changes in cash rental rates will be approximately $109-$114,
which could be reached in three to four years. The first-year increase is about $80 on average,
which is consistent with what we get from the variable profit function estimation provided
earlier. The adjustment speed and corresponding dynamic adjustment path to the long-run
equilibrium vary across the state and depend mainly on the average soil quality of cropland in
a specific county. As shown in figure 9, cash rental rates will increase an average of $20-$25 in
the year following the price shock, $5-$7 in year t+ 2, $1-$2 in year t+ 3, and so on.
However, we note that the average yield in Iowa over the 1987-2005 period is 135 bushels
per acre. The RRT suggests that the long-run equilibrium level corresponding to $1 increase
of corn price should be around $135. It is about $20 more than our long-run effect estimation.
Besides estimation error, the price and income supports farmers obtained from U.S. agricultural
programs through the data range may explain part of this disparity. When the effect of a
downward corn price movement is eliminated by government support through a price floor,
then cash rents should respond to an increase in corn price only when it is above a certain level.
Also, the questionable bargaining power assumption underlying the RRT may provide us
with another explanation for incomplete long-run responses. In addition to landlords and ten-
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ant farmers, seed suppliers may have some degree of bargaining power in the division of cash
rents. Private seed companies are typically well protected by patents, licenses, and other intel-
lectual property rights (Moschini and Lapan 1997). These protections, and also seed industry
concentration, may have enabled seed companies to capture the benefits of their innovation
through prices (Jolly and Lence 2000). In other words, continuing adoption of GE corn and
soybeans may have conferred seed companies with significant bargaining power, and seed com-
panies may be able to appropriate some farmland cash rents. So lack of consideration for the
role that seed suppliers may play is perhaps another reason why the estimated long-run response
in rent to a $1 increase in corn price is only about 0.82 of what RRT suggests.
Conclusions
Using unique panel data set and a random effects model, we find that cropland cash rental
rates in Iowa are largely determined by output/input prices, soil quality, relative location, and
other county-specific factors. This is investigated in the variable profit function framework.
Also, cash rents go up by about $79 for a $1 increase in corn price in the short run. The
marginal value of cropland quality is about $1.05, as represented by the row-crop CSR index.
We find no significant local effects of ethanol plants on cash rents, as their effects appeared
to be largely channeled through national futures prices. The dynamic analysis results indicate
that the total effect of land rents is approximately $109-$114. The adjustment paths vary
considerably across the state and probably depend on farmland soil quality. The validity of
Ricardian rent theory is tested. In an analysis of cash rent responses to a $1 increase in
corn price, the short-run analysis failed to meet the average value of $135 suggested by the
theory. Part of this discrepancy might be explained by inertia in the contract re-negotiation
process, which may be induced by community ties and relationship-specific investments in the
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rented land and contractual relation. Furthermore, the long-run price effect estimate is still
$20 below the theoretical value. The price and income support that farmers have received from
government programs may be one explanation for this shortfall. Some of the disparity may also
be captured by seed suppliers, as they certainly have market power when pricing GE corn and
soybean seeds.
We have four remarks about future possible extensions to our study. First, the theory of
cooperative games is particularly well suited for analyzing the behavior of participants in the
division of farmland cash rents. In the game, landlord, tenant farmer, and seed supplier come
together to bargain over the surplus cash rents. Cash rents can be assumed to be divided
among them according to the Shapley value (Shapley 1953), which defines the payoff to each
individual participant based on his marginal contribution to the surplus. As a measure of
bargaining power in this allocation game, the Shapley value pins down the magnitude of rent
that each player will receive in the bargaining process and would allow us to better understand
the equilibrium impact of rapidly changing biotechnology on land rents.
Second, government payments have important effects on farmland cash rents. Whether
farmers are the ultimate recipients and to what extent they benefit from government payments
are still open questions. Roberts, Kirwan, and Hopkins (2003) used data from the 1992 and
1997 Census of Agriculture and found that $0.34-$0.41 of every $1 of government payment
is reflected in the land rents. From Kirwan (2005), we learn that landlords capture $0.25 of
the marginal subsidy per acre. Using Iowa county-level panel data over the 1996-2000 period,
Lence and Mishra (2003) concluded that a $1 additional payment for market assistance and
production flexibility contracts pushed up cash rental rates by $0.86 per acre. Goodwin, Mishra,
and Ortalo-Magne´ (2004) indicate that an additional $1 in loan deficiency payments raises the
cash rents by $0.57. Exploring our unique panel data set may help us shed clearer light on this
issue.
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A third possible extension is to break out a real option component to land rents. After
negotiating and signing a rental agreement, which typically happens in August in Iowa, the
tenant farmer has the option to choose between corn and soybeans for the next crop season.
Hence, the corn and soybean futures prices, price volatilities, and correlation between these
prices will affect a farmer’s planting decision and land rents that he/she is willing to pay.
The real option component of land rents could help us better understand the determinants of
cropland cash rental rates. Finally, there is the issue of institutional price floors, such as the
loan rate program and the target price program that was terminated in 1996. One can test
for asymmetric responses of cash rental rates to corn price when the price is above or below a
government price floor.
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Table 2. Grid Search Result for Price
Selection
κ Log-likelihood κ Log-likelihood
0 1074.44 0.5 1095.65
0.8 1158.49 0.9 1176.61
0.95 1183.84 1 1189.76
Table 3. Variables Description
Variable Description
pc Normalized corn futures prices
pf Normalized fertilizer prices
CSR Soil quality
BW County relative location in the east-west direction
BN County relative location in the south-north direction
t Time (t = 1 at 1987)
Scale of Livestock Industry Grain-consuming animal units
Ethanol Production Effect Effect of local ethanol production
Urbanization Effect Minimum normalized distance to metropolitan areas
Adoption of GM Crops Adoption ratio of GE crops
θ2 Fraction of variance due to unobservable effects
δ Spatial autocorrelation
ρ Temporal autocorrelation
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Table 4. Estimates of the Random Effects Model
Explanatory Variables Parameter Asymp. t-stat. Z-Value
1 Constant 0.387 0.173 0.863
2 ln(pc) 1.683 1.528 0.126
3 ln(pf) -2.906 –5.095 0.000
4 12 ln(pc)
2 0.559 0.562 0.574
5 ln(pc)× ln(pf) -3.934 -9.518 0.000
6 12 ln(pf)
2 -1.145 -2.098 0.036
7 CSR 0.061 1.216 0.224
8 BW -0.030 -0.467 0.641
9 BN 0.186 2.683 0.007
10 12(CSR)
2 -0.001 -0.976 0.329
11 12(BW)
2 0.006 3.106 0.002
12 12(BN)
2 -0.020 -6.389 0.000
13 CSR× BW -0.0002 -0.269 0.788
14 CSR× BN -0.0009 -1.193 0.233
15 BW × BN 0.001 0.793 0.428
16 ln(pc)× CSR -0.00009 0.019 0.984
17 ln(pc)× BW 0.003 0.276 0.783
18 ln(pc)× BN -0.012 -0.888 0.375
19 ln(pf)× CSR 0.002 0.691 0.490
20 ln(pf)× BW 0.005 0.809 0.419
21 ln(pf)× BN -0.001 -0.187 0.852
22 ln(pc)× t 0.247 9.731 0.000
23 ln(pf)× t 0.082 4.146 0.000
24 CSR× t -0.0004 -2.728 0.006
25 BW × t -0.0003 -0.754 0.451
26 BN × t -0.0008 -2.072 0.038
27 t 0.264 8.382 0.000
28 t2 -0.009 -10.232 0.000
29 Scale of Livestock Industry 0.018 2.260 0.024
30 Ethanol Plant Effect 0.012 0.781 0.435
31 Urbanization Effect -0.023 -1.781 0.075
32 Adoption of GM Crops 0.820 7.992 0.000
33 θ2 0.643 8.556 0.000
34 δ 0.789 43.211 0.000
35 ρ 0.371 13.488 0.000
R2 0.9866
adjusted R2 0.9863
Number of cross-sections 83
Number of years 19
Total number of observations 1577
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Table 6. Individual Time Series Unit
Root Tests
ADF KPSS
Cash rental rates -1.661 .712
Corn futures prices -2.584 .497
Notes: The 1% and 5% critical values are
-3.750 and -3.000 for ADF test, respec-
tively; for KPSS test, the corresponding
values are 0.739 and 0.463, respectively.
Both tests are carried out in STATA 9
(STATA Corporation 2005).
Table 7. Panel Unit Root Tests for Cash Rental
Rates
Test Statistics 1% Critical Value p-value
LLC -16.614 -4.709 0.000
IPS -1.991 -1.730 0.000
C-ADF -2.531 -2.180 0.000
Note: All tests are carried out in STATA 9 (STATA Cor-
poration 2005).
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Table 8. Estimates of the Error Correction Model
MG Std. Err. PMG Std. Err.
Long-run multiplier 113.701 2.685 108.717 2.142
Error correction coefficient -0.736 0.026 -0.730 0.026
Short-run coefficient 79.413 2.871 81.755 2.920
Table 9. Regression Analysis of Long-run Effect (MG) and Adjustment Speed
(PMG) Estimates
Long Run Effect Adjustment Speed
Explanatory Variables Parameter t-stat. Z-Value Parameter t-stat. Z-Value
Constant 10.91 0.31 0.76 -0.16 -0.40 0.69
CSR -0.64 -1.60 0.11 0.01** 2.34 0.02
Rent 2005 1.09*** 5.88 0.00 0.001 0.65 0.52
BN 0.88 0.88 0.38 -0.002 -0.21 0.83
BW -0.21 -0.30 0.77 -0.01 -1.37 0.17
Urbanization effect 0.64 0.03 0.98 -0.057 -0.23 0.82
R2 0.3158 0.1145
adjusted R2 0.2714 0.0570
Notes: See Table 3 for definitions of the explanatory variables.
Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively.
50
F
ig
u
re
1
.
C
a
sh
R
e
n
ta
l
R
a
te
s,
2
0
0
5
($
/
a
cr
e
/
y
e
a
r)
51
F
ig
u
re
2
.
C
o
u
n
ty
A
v
e
ra
g
e
R
o
w
C
ro
p
C
S
R
In
d
e
x
52
F
ig
u
re
3
.
C
o
u
n
ty
R
e
la
ti
v
e
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
53
F
ig
u
re
4
.
G
ra
in
-C
o
n
su
m
in
g
A
n
im
a
l
U
n
it
s,
2
0
0
5
54
F
ig
u
re
5
.
E
th
a
n
o
l
P
la
n
ts
in
O
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
,
2
0
0
5
55
F
ig
u
re
6
.
M
e
tr
o
p
o
li
ta
n
A
re
a
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
a
n
d
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
56
F
ig
u
re
7
.
L
o
n
g
-R
u
n
E
ff
e
ct
s
(M
G
)
57
F
ig
u
re
8
.
E
rr
o
r
C
o
rr
e
ct
io
n
C
o
e
ffi
ci
e
n
ts
(P
M
G
)
58
F
ig
u
re
9
.
M
G
/
P
M
G
E
st
im
a
te
s
o
f
D
y
n
a
m
ic
A
d
ju
st
m
e
n
ts
59
Appendix
Table 10. Missing Data Information
County Missing Years County Missing Years
Data included in the study (83 counties)
Adams 1994 Audubon 1988
Calhoun 1993 Cherokee 1994
Clarke 1989,92,94,95,98 Crawford 1998
Decatur 1993 Dubuque 1995
Fremont 1987,88,89 Ida 1993
Iowa 1995 Jones 1995
Mills 1987 Monona 1993,94,95
O’Brien 1994 Palo Alto 1987,88
Plymouth 1994 Poweshiek 1995
Sac 1993 Taylor 1989,94
Union 1995 Woodbury 1993,94,95
Data not included (16 counties)
Appanoose 1987-96 Davis 1987-92,94,96
Des Moines 1987-92,94-96 Henry 1987-92,94,96
Jefferson 1987-92,94-96 Keokuk 1987-92,94-96
Lee 1987-92,95-96 Louisa 1987-91,94-96
Lucas 1987-92,94-96 Marion 1987-92,94
Mahaska 1987-92,94-95 Monroe 1987-92,94-96
Van Buren 1987-92,94,96 Wapello 1987-92,94-96
Washington 1987-91,94-96 Wayne 1987-92,96
Notes: The missing data for the 83 counties included in this
study are linearly interpolated using the corresponding com-
mand in Matlab.
We exclude the counties that have missing data for five or more
continuous years. The above 16 counties are excluded also be-
cause they are spatially contiguous in the southeast corner of
Iowa.
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